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Andrew Goring*
Abstract
This Note identifies a timely issue with student loans and discusses
potential remedies. Under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program,
borrowers of federal student loans who make 120 qualifying monthly
payments while working in public service may have their loans forgiven.
When a loan is forgiven, the borrower no longer has to pay the remaining
balance of the debt. Since both the prevalence of student loans and the
average student debt are increasing, loan forgiveness is an important
opportunity for borrowers under the crushing debt of student loans.
However, a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau report found a rising
problem: Loan servicers are leading borrowers to believe that borrowers’
monthly payments qualify for loan forgiveness, when they in fact do not.
Right now, the only solution for those borrowers is to restart the clock on
their ten years of public service. This Note determines that there are
several causes of action that could be brought against student loan
servicers in order to offer relief to borrowers who believed their loans
would be forgiven.
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INTRODUCTION
The Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program was introduced
as part of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act1 in 2007.2 The
concept behind PSLF is simple: A student loan borrower who works in
public service for ten years3 can get his student loans discharged.4
October 1, 2017, marked ten years from the first qualifying payments for
PSLF,5 so borrowers working in public service have only recently been
able to have their loans forgiven under the PSLF program. The results
have been shocking: The PSLF program has rejected ninety-nine percent
of applicants who completed ten years of payments, with the most
common reason for rejection being that the payments did not count as
“qualifying payments.”6
According to a recent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
report, deceptive practices by federal loan servicers have caused some
borrowers to believe that their loan payments were contributing toward
forgiveness, when in fact they were not.7 In some situations, servicers
were aware that borrowers had qualifying public service jobs and did not
inform those borrowers of their eligibility for PSLF.8 The CFPB report
tells the story of one borrower who informed his servicer of his intention
to enroll in PSLF.9 His servicer consolidated his loans for that purpose,
and when the borrower asked whether he was qualified, the servicer told
him he was “all set.”10 It was not until four years later that the borrower
learned that his payments were not counting toward the 120 monthly

1. Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C.).
2. Robert Proudfoot, Securitization of Student Loans: A Proposal to Reform Federal
Accounting, Reduce Government Risk, and Introduce Market Mechanisms as Indicators of
Quality Education, 9 U. MASS. L. REV. 6, 21–23 (2014).
3. To be more specific, 120 monthly payments, which need not be made on consecutive
months. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2018).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Public Service Loan Forgiveness Data, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa
/about/data-center/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data [https://perma.cc/7QNV-2XVQ] (containing a
March 2019 PSLF report); Zach Friedman, Student Loan Forgiveness Program Rejects 99% of
Applicants, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/
2018/09/24/public-service-loan-forgiveness-rejected/#342c71b91824 [https://perma.cc/3RYB-G6K7].
7. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STAYING ON TRACK WHILE GIVING BACK: THE COST OF
STUDENT LOAN SERVICING BREAKDOWNS FOR PEOPLE SERVING THEIR COMMUNITIES 29–31
(2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_PSLF-midyear-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LH86-J8WG].
8. Id.
9. Id. at 30.
10. Id.
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payments required for PSLF.11 In a recent class action lawsuit against a
student loan servicer,12 former professor and meteorologist Bill Cottrill
describes how he “asked the right questions” about his student loan
payments.13 Nevertheless, after ten years of payments totaling $130,000,
Cottrill’s servicer told him that he had the wrong type of loan—it could
not be forgiven—and now Cottrill must “delay[] retirement another
decade.”14 Stories like these show that there are clear gaps in the system.
This Note aims to address how those gaps can be filled.
One of the greatest sources of confusion for borrowers is whether their
student loans qualify for PSLF.15 In order for a loan payment to count
toward PSLF, that payment must be for a Direct loan.16 Congress
implemented Direct loans in 1994 as a replacement for federally
guaranteed private loans under the Federal Family Education Loans
(FFEL) program.17 While FFEL loans were discontinued in 2010, 21.6
million borrowers still owe $437 billion on the program.18 No payments
toward a FFEL loan count toward PSLF.19 Although a FFEL loan can be
consolidated into a Direct loan, only subsequent payments under the
Direct loan will count toward PSLF.20 To complicate matters, the only
way for a borrower to find out whether his loans are Direct or FFEL is to
go to the National Student Loan Data System and create a profile; the
servicers’ websites and billing statements do not contain this
information.21 So even if a borrower working in public service discovers
that his loans are under the FFEL program, his only option for loan

11. Id.
12. Class Action Complaint, Daniel v. Navient Solutions, LLC, No. 8:17-cv-02503 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 25, 2017).
13. Jackie Callaway, Navient Accused of Misleading Students About Loan Forgiveness,
ABC ACTION NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018, 12:06 PM), https://www.abcactionnews.com/money/
consumer/taking-action-for-you/navient-accused-of-misleading-students-about-loan-forgiveness[https://perma.cc/L529-2N52].
14. Id.
15. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 30.
16. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(1)(iii) (2018); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at
29.
17. Terrence L. Michael & Janie M. Phelps, “Judges?! – We Don’t Need No Stinking
Judges!!!”: The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Cases and the Income Contingent
Repayment Plan, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 73, 81 (2005).
18. Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of Student Loans: A Critical
Examination, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215, 221 (2014).
19. Id. at 232.
20. Id.
21. What Type of Loan Do I Have?, STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE, http://www.
studentloanborrowerassistance.org/start-here/what-type-of-loan-do-i-have/ [https://perma.cc/
8ZF3-8CP5].
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forgiveness is to consolidate the FFEL loans into a Direct loan and restart
the clock for another ten years of public service.
Although one might argue that it is borrowers’ responsibility to ensure
that they have the correct type of loan, there are several reasons why the
law should protect student loan borrowers from their servicers. First of
all, the increasing requirement of college degrees for entry-level jobs,
combined with the increasing cost of tuition, means that student loans are
becoming increasingly necessary for young Americans.22 In 2014,
graduates had an average debt of $29,40023 and studies show that most
students overestimate their ability to repay their student loans.24 Another
issue is that during bankruptcy, there is a higher bar25 to discharge student
loans than other types of loans.26 This is largely due to several highly
publicized but misrepresentative bankruptcy cases during the early
1970s, in which recent graduates went on to lucrative careers shortly after
discharging their student loans in bankruptcy.27 Finally, graduates who
seek public interest work are at greater financial risk because public
interest jobs typically have much lower salaries than private sector jobs.28
In fact, the Department of Education has estimated that a college graduate
working in public service may end up repaying over 170% of their initial
principal balance.29 This results in a class of borrowers who are under
22. William J. Cox, The Student Borrower: Slave to the Servicer?, 27 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 189, 195 (2015); Mitch et al., Financial Help Puts Public Interest Careers in Reach, 81 WIS.
LAW. 25, 25 (2008).
23. For law school graduates, the average debt ranges from one and a half to over two times
as much. L. Kinvin Wroth, Access to Justice: The Problem of Law Student Debt, 30 VT. B.J. 28,
28 (2004).
24. Cox, supra note 22, at 195–96. In fact, for many Americans, student loan repayment is
becoming a lifelong endeavor—a CFPB study shows that over the past several years, the number
of borrowers over the age of sixty with student loan debt has increased in every state and that the
median debt of those elderly borrowers has increased in nearly every state. CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, OLDER CONSUMERS AND STUDENT LOAN DEBT BY STATE 4–9 (2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/5184/201708_cfpb_older-consumers-and-studentloan-debt-by-state.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU6H-NDAZ].
25. The Brunner Test, requiring a showing of undue hardship in order to discharge student
loans, has been “judicially defined too harshly by most of the bankruptcy courts.” Kevin J. Smith,
Defining the Brunner Test’s Three Parts: Time to Set a National Standard for All Three Parts to
Determine When to Allow the Discharge of Federal Student Loans, 58 S.D. L. REV. 250, 251
(2013). However, some studies show that the discharge of student loans through bankruptcy is
still quite feasible. Jason Iuliano, Student Loans and Surmountable Access-to-Justice Barriers, 68
FLA. L. REV. 377, 388 (2016).
26. Kurtis Wiard, Hope for the Hopeless: Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 84 J.
KAN. B. ASS’N 24, 25 (2015).
27. Id.
28. Wroth, supra note 23, at 28 (noting that the average salary for government lawyers is
less than half that of private practice attorneys).
29. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 26–27.
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pressure to take on high amounts of debt with few options to pay it back,
and who are ripe for exploitation. Student loan servicers are too happy to
oblige.
In 2013, the CFPB acknowledged student loan borrowers’ increased
reports of abuse by servicers by announcing that it would investigate the
issue.30 According to the director of the CFPB, the agency intended to
change servicer practices “meant to defraud borrowers” by extending
oversight to the largest servicers.31 The investigation highlighted several
concerning issues.32 While servicers have greatly increased the number
of repayment options for borrowers, the change has also resulted in a
much more complicated and difficult-to-navigate system.33 There is over
a twenty percent variance in delinquency rates across the repayment plans
available for federal Direct loans, which shows that getting into the right
repayment plan is crucial for borrowers.34 However, borrowers report not
being adequately informed about their options, even when experiencing
financial hardship.35 For example, some servicers advised borrowers to
postpone payments through forbearance—which is an attractive shortterm solution, but can make a difficult financial situation worse by
significantly increasing the amount of unpaid interest—instead of
informing borrowers about lower repayment options.36 Borrowers further
report that even when they identify the repayment plan that best fits their
financial needs to their loan servicers, the servicers sometimes enroll
them in a different repayment plan.37 Also, over half of borrowers who
enroll in an income-based repayment plan fail to properly submit the
annual income documentation requirements,38 which results in severe
consequences.39 Finally, borrowers are penalized for missing payments
when they are transferred to a different servicer without notice, or when
30. Katheryn E. Marcum, Tightening the Loophole: The Role of Fee-Shifting Statutes in
Resolving the Growing Problem of Servicing America’s Student Loan Debt, 119 W. VA. L. REV.
829, 841–42 (2016).
31. Id. at 842.
32. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC INPUT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 20–38 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201509_cfpb_student-loan-servicing-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/47Y8-SW8K].
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 22–23.
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id. at 25–27.
37. Id. at 27–28.
38. Although this failure is not entirely the fault of the borrower, as will become evident in
Part III.
39. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 32, at 31–36. For example, when the
recertification for an income-driven repayment plan is not processed in time, the borrower is billed
at the much higher standard repayment rate, which can result in interest capitalization, forced
forbearance, and the loss of government subsidies. Id. at 33–35.
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they are told that their loan is in forbearance, but their forbearance
application is later denied.40
Part of the problem is that student loan servicers often benefit from
the financial hardship their practices bring upon borrowers. Servicers are
compensated with a flat monthly fee per account serviced.41 Because
servicers’ fees do not depend on the level of service given to borrowers,
“this fee structure may create an economic disincentive to address
borrower default.”42 So whenever a servicer advises that a borrower go
into forbearance instead of using an income-adjusted repayment plan, the
servicer gets easy money for the years that the borrower is in forbearance
in addition to the money from the increased time it will take the borrower
to eventually repay the loan, since the borrower will have to pay a greater
amount after coming out of forbearance.43 Furthermore, servicers “may
be reluctant to inform borrowers of PSLF” because whenever a borrower
successfully enrolls in the PSLF program, that borrower is transferred to
a different, dedicated PSLF servicer.44 The longstanding federal
regulatory scheme similarly discouraged protective action for borrowers
for two main reasons.45 First, the same agencies charged with overseeing
banks also had “a primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of
the banking system.”46 Second, the regulating agencies made more
money if they regulated more banks, but the banks were able to choose
which agency regulated them.47 Thus, regulators who actually enforced
consumer protection law risked their profitability.48
In response to the recent economic recession and the realization that
the bank regulatory system did not work, the legislature implemented the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act49 (DoddFrank Act).50 Most notably, the Act created the CFPB and established a
presumption against preemption.51 The significance of the CFPB is
evident by the extent of its investigations into student loan servicer
practices, but it also serves an important function in its authorization to
40. Id. at 39, 51–52.
41. Id. at 134.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 44–45.
45. Cox, supra note 22, at 208.
46. Id. at 208 & n.158 (quoting Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 90 (2008)).
47. Id. at 208–09.
48. Id. at 209.
49. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
50. Cox, supra note 22, at 214.
51. Id. at 214–15.
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prescribe rules.52 While the CFPB does not have explicit authority over
student loan servicers, it passed a larger-participant rule in 2014, which
allows the CFPB to exercise supervisory authority over certain larger
participants in a market.53 This supervisory authority allows the CFPB to
regulate large54 student loan servicers engaging in unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices.55
When placed into the greater context of servicers’ abusive treatment
of student loan borrowers, the problem of misinformed borrowers eligible
for PSLF but not enrolled in the program is clearly an injustice. As one
servicer commented in reply to allegations of misleading borrowers,
“[W]e are on the front lines of repayment every day, so we know how
complex the federal loan program can be.”56 And yet, servicers blame
borrowers—most of whom likely have little to no experience with the
federal loan system—for not servicing errors.57 This is not merely a
matter of borrowers sleeping on their rights; it is the result of a systematic
exploitation of vulnerable debtors. Several recent changes have set the
stage for judicial action against student loan servicers, and with the recent
ten-year anniversary of the PSLF program, the time is ripe for action.
This Note examines the possible remedies for borrowers who were
not adequately informed about their eligibility for PSLF. Part I concludes
that state law claims should not be preempted by the Higher Education
Act of 1965,58 despite a Ninth Circuit decision holding otherwise. Part II
evaluates three viable state law remedies. Part III considers unfair,
deceptive, and abusive acts and practices under Title X of the Dodd-Frank
Act. Based on the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in denying
a Motion to Dismiss for claims brought against a student loan servicer, it
is likely that those claims would also be effective at securing PSLF
remedies.
I. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS
The Dodd-Frank Act’s presumption against preemption is believed to
be “one of the most important fixes to federal consumer protection
regulation since the subprime mortgage crisis.”59 Prior to the Act,
52. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012).
53. Cox, supra note 22, at 218–20.
54. The larger-participant rule gives the CFPB authority over all the government’s servicers
and two private loan servicers, but not smaller private loan servicers, comprising 29% of the
student loan market. Id. at 220–21.
55. Id. at 219–20.
56. Callaway, supra note 13.
57. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
59. Cox, supra note 22, at 215.
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banking regulators used preemption to halt state efforts at consumer
protection.60 Now, the Dodd-Frank Act allows state laws that offer
greater protection than, or are not inconsistent with, the Act.61 Otherwise,
the Dodd-Frank Act can only preempt state consumer protection laws if:
(A) application of a State consumer financial law would
have a discriminatory effect on national banks, in
comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered by
that State;
(B) . . . the State consumer financial law prevents or
significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank
of its powers . . . ; or
(C) the State consumer financial law is preempted by a
provision of Federal law other than title 62 of the Revised
Statutes.62
However, federal circuit courts have disagreed in the application of
(C).63 The Ninth Circuit has held that the Higher Education Act of 1965
preempts state law claims, while the Fourth Circuit has held that it does
not.64
A. Circuit Split over Preemption
Borrowers who try to bring any state law claims against their servicers
will have to overcome the argument that state law claims are preempted
by the Higher Education Act, particularly after the Ninth Circuit decision
in Chae v. SLM Corp.65 In Chae, student loan borrowers brought
California business, contract, and consumer protection claims against
their loan servicer.66 The Ninth Circuit first determined whether any of
the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by express preemption.67 Where
Congress enacts an express preemption, the court’s task is to “interpret
the provision and ‘identify the domain expressly pre-empted by that
language.’”68 In total, the Ninth Circuit identified that the Higher
Education Act preempted the operation of state usury laws, statutes of
limitations, limitations on recovering the costs of debt collection, infancy
defenses to contract liability, wage garnishment limitations, and
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 209.
12 U.S.C. § 5551(a) (2012); Cox, supra note 22, at 215.
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b).
Cox, supra note 22, at 215–16.
Id. at 216 n.222.
593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 941.
Id. at 942.
Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996)).
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disclosure requirements.69 Of these, the court concluded that the
preemption of state disclosure requirements barred the plaintiffs’
misrepresentation claims.70 In doing so, the court reasoned that “[a]t
bottom, the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims are improper-disclosure
claims.”71
Of course, the servicers’ failure to “proactively inform” borrowers
about PSLF does sound like an improper disclosure claim under the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning.72 However, the express preemption for disclosure
requirements is limited to “loans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant
to a program authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of
1965.”73 In contrast, the PSLF program is neither a loan nor authorized
by the Higher Education Act.74 Indeed, as the Southern District of New
York observed, “there is nothing in the HEA that standardizes or
coordinates how a customer service representative of a third-party loan
servicer like Sallie Mae shall interact with a customer . . . in the day-today servicing of his loan.”75 The remaining challenge for student loan
borrowers to overcome, and the issue upon which the circuits are split, is
whether state claims are barred by conflict preemption.
Conflict preemption is derived from the principle that a state law is
preempted if it creates an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”76 The court determines
Congress’s objectives by “examining the federal statute as a whole and
identifying its purpose and intended effects.”77 In Chae, the Ninth Circuit
evaluated the FFEL program’s explicitly stated purposes and determined
that the underlying objective was to “make lending to college students a
less-risky proposition.”78 It further determined that the intended effect of
the program was uniformity.79 The court primarily attributed the intention
of uniformity to the “comprehensive framework” of the Act and its
“precisely-detailed provisions.”80 In connecting the program’s objective
and purpose, the court observed that “exposure to lawsuits under fifty
separate sets of laws and court systems could make lenders reluctant to
69. Id.
70. Id. at 942–43 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1098g).
71. Id. at 942.
72. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 30–32.
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1098g (Supp. V 2018).
74. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2018).
75. Genna v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 11-CV-7371(LBS), 2012 WL 1339482, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 17, 2012).
76. Chae, 593 F.3d at 943.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 947.
80. Id. at 944.
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make new federally-guaranteed student loans.”81 Concluding that the
application of California consumer protection law would upset the FFEL
program’s uniformity, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’
remaining claims were conflict-preempted by the Higher Education
Act.82
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp.83
was not convinced that uniformity was “actually an important goal of the
HEA.”84 Instead, the Fourth Circuit focused on the explicitly stated
purposes of the FFEL program under § 1071(a)(1) of the Higher
Education Act85:
(A) to encourage States and nonprofit private institutions
and organizations to establish adequate loan insurance
programs for students in eligible institutions (as defined in
section 1085 of this title),
(B) to provide a Federal program of student loan
insurance for students or lenders who do not have reasonable
access to a State or private nonprofit program of student loan
insurance covered by an agreement under section 1078(b) of
this title,
(C) to pay a portion of the interest on loans to qualified
students which are insured under this part, and
(D) to guarantee a portion of each loan insured under a
program of a State or of a nonprofit private institution or
organization which meets the requirements of section
1078(a)(1)(B) of this title.86
The Fourth Circuit further did not believe that the mere existence of
an extensive system of regulations was sufficient to preempt
nonconflicting state law.87 It cited to the Supreme Court for two important
propositions. First, “[t]o infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals
with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that
whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field, its regulations will
be exclusive.”88 Second, “pre-emption is ordinarily not to be implied
81. Id. at 945 (quoting Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
82. Id. at 950.
83. 396 F.3d 588 (4th Cir. 2005).
84. Id. at 597.
85. Id.
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (2012).
87. College Loan Corp., 396 F.3d at 598.
88. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985).
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absent an ‘actual conflict.’”89 The court concluded that it should not
“seek[ ] out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none
clearly exists.”90 Thus, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits disagree about
whether uniformity was such an important intention of Congress in
drafting the Higher Education Act that it should preempt state law.
B. Problems with Preemption
No other circuits have weighed in on the issue yet, and thus the
conflict is largely unresolved. Even though the Fourth Circuit opinion
was written first and was rebutted by the Ninth Circuit in a much lengthier
discussion, the Fourth Circuit better adhered to precedent. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit seems to have blended conflict preemption with field
preemption. There are three types of preemption: “(1) Congress enacts a
statute that explicitly pre-empts state law [express preemption]; (2) state
law actually conflicts with federal law [conflict preemption]; or (3)
federal law occupies a legislative field to such an extent that it is
reasonable to conclude that Congress left no room for state regulation in
that field [field preemption].”91 The Ninth Circuit has held that field
preemption does not apply to the Higher Education Act, and that field
preemption is “off the table to resolve this case.”92 Nevertheless, its
application of conflict preemption seems very similar to field preemption.
Compare the definition of field preemption above with the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning, in Chae, that Congress intended the Higher Education Act to
be uniform:
After reviewing the FFELP as a whole, we agree with the
DOE that Congress intended it to operate uniformly. That
intent is shown by the comprehensive framework that
Congress set up to govern the $2 billion per year program.
The statutes describe the nuts and bolts of the FFELP,
defining the required terms of each type of loan. The statutes
go so far as to mandate specified repayment terms and
specified insurance and guaranty requirements. As one
example, the FFELP sets the maximum interest rate that a
lender may charge, depending on the type of loan and the
date when it was taken out. Such precisely-detailed
89. Id. (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990)).
90. Id. (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 90).
91. Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tocher v. City of Santa
Ana, 219 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000)).
92. Id. at 941–42. Other courts have also concluded that the Higher Education Act does not
occupy the field so as to preempt state claims. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Accrediting Council, 168
F.3d 1362, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1999), amended, 177 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir.); Morgan v. Markerdowne
Corp., 976 F. Supp. 301, 318 (D.N.J. 1997).
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FFELP

The Ninth Circuit essentially reasoned that Congress had left no room
for state regulation in the field, and therefore Congress intended that the
Higher Education Act be uniform. It then reasoned that any state
legislation “would threaten [the Department of Education’s] ability to
carry out the congressional objectives of ensuring uniformity and stability
within the [Higher Education Act],” and that state law therefore is
preempted by the Act.94
Indeed, the reasoning in Chae is very similar to the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Hines v. Davidowitz.95 In Hines, the Court concluded that
because the Alien Registration Act of 1940 was “a single integrated and
all-embracing system . . . it plainly manifested a purpose to do so in such
a way as to protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through
one uniform national registration system,” and any state law was
therefore preempted.96 However, Hines has been consistently
characterized as an example of field preemption—not conflict
preemption.97 Therefore, Chae’s reasoning should be characterized as
field preemption as well. This is problematic for Chae because of the
Ninth Circuit’s previous holding that field preemption does not apply to
the Higher Education Act.98 By reasoning that any state law would
conflict with Congress’s intention that the Higher Education Act be
uniform, the Ninth Circuit essentially circumvented its earlier holding
that field preemption does not apply to the Higher Education Act.
Furthermore, courts do not infer an intent of uniformity merely
because legislation is comprehensive.99 In Hines, the primary
consideration was not necessarily the comprehensiveness of the Alien
Registration Act, but rather the issues it addressed.100 The Court was most
swayed by the Act’s effects on international relations and human rights,
both of which the Court recognized to be uniquely suited for federal
legislation.101 In fact, the field of student loans is less like the field of
93. Chae, 593 F.3d at 944 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 949.
95. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
96. Id. at 74.
97. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 322 (3rd Cir. 2013).
98. Chae, 593 F.3d at 941–42.
99. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc. 471 U.S. 707, 707 (1985).
100. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67–68.
101. Id. (“And in that determination [of preemption], it is of importance that this legislation
is in a field which affects international relations, the one aspect of our government that from the
first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority. . . . And
it is also of importance that this legislation deals with the rights, liberties, and personal freedoms
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alien registration and more like that of tax statutes, which the Court
considered to be “an entirely different category,” presumably unworthy
of federal preemption.102 Student loans further seem to fall into the
category of fiduciary responsibilities, for which the Second Circuit
recognized that “[t]here does not appear to be a pressing need for national
uniformity.”103 The Second Circuit further did not see “any unreasonable
burden placed upon union officers required to comply with the fiduciary
requirements of the various states in which their unions function,”104 in
contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that uniformity was necessary
to avoid “exposure to lawsuits under fifty separate sets of laws and court
systems.”105 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s insistence that the Higher
Education Act’s comprehensiveness is proof of Congressional intent of
uniformity may very well be ill-founded.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit does not point to any actual conflict between
a state law and the Higher Education Act.106 While the servicer in Chae
implemented the Higher Education Act in a way that conflicted with
California law,107 the Higher Education Act is broad enough that the
conflict could have been averted. For example, the Higher Education Act
permits, but does not require, a late fee, while California law prohibits a
late fee.108 Also, the Higher Education Act allows servicers to set the first
repayment date up to sixty days after disbursement, while California law
provides a shorter window.109 Thus, there was no actual conflict because
it was entirely possible for the servicer to comply with both California
law and the Higher Education Act. It should be noted that courts apply
two different definitions for conflict preemption: conflict preemption
exists either where “it is impossible for a private party to comply with
both state and federal requirements” or where state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”110 Chae relies on the latter definition, that state
law is preempted when it is an obstacle to federal law,111 seemingly
of human beings, and is in an entirely different category from state tax statutes or state pure food
laws regulating the labels on cans.”).
102. Id.
103. Fitzgerald v. Catherwood, 388 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1968).
104. Id.
105. Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 945 (2010) (quoting Brannan v. United Student Aid
Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
106. See generally Chae, 593 F.3d 936.
107. Id. at 940–41.
108. Id. at 947.
109. Id. at 947–48.
110. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
111. Chae, 593 F.3d at 943.
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because it was not impossible for the student loan servicer to comply with
both state and federal requirements. The issue with this is that the
“obstacle” language traces back to Hines, in which the Supreme Court
was actually discussing field preemption.112 The position that obstacle
preemption is not in fact conflict preemption is consistent with how the
Supreme Court has “observed repeatedly that pre-emption is ordinarily
not to be implied absent an ‘actual conflict.’”113 An actual conflict should
mean one that makes it impossible to comply with both state and federal
law, not merely one that creates an obstacle in doing so. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit’s entire analysis, from establishing a congressional intent of
uniformity to finding California state law to be an obstacle to that intent,
uses the term conflict preemption while actually using the language and
analysis of field preemption. Because field preemption does not apply to
the HEA, Chae, or any case determined on similar grounds, it should not
justify the preemption of state law remedies to aggrieved student loan
debtors unless it is actually impossible for the loan servicer to comply
with both federal and state laws.
II. STATE LAW CLAIMS
With the issue of preemption resolved, this Note now turns to potential
remedies for borrowers who were misled by their servicers into making
years of payments that did not count toward PSLF.
A. Negligent or Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Borrowers who were told that their student loans payments were
eligible for PSLF when they in fact were not may have either a negligent
or fraudulent misrepresentation claim, or both. The elements for these
misrepresentations are “essentially the same,” with the only difference
being the scienter requirement.114 Fraudulent misrepresentation requires
“the representor’s knowledge that the representation is false,” while
negligent misrepresentation instead requires that the representor
“reasonably should have known of the statement’s falsity.”115 Including
the scienter requirement, there are four elements for each claim: “(1) a
112. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–68 (“And in that determination [of whether Pennsylvania’s law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress”], it is of importance that this legislation is in a field which affects international
relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally conceded
imperatively to demand broad national authority.”).
113. English, 496 U.S. at 90.
114. Rogers v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1312 (N.D. Fla. 2003) (applying
Florida law).
115. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Elders v. United Methodist Church, 793 So. 2d 1038,
1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)).
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false statement concerning a material fact; (2) [the scienter requirement];
(3) an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and (4)
consequent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation.”116
Florida courts have acknowledged the possibility that the plaintiff’s
detrimental reliance could be either an action or refraining from action.117
As a tort claim, negligent misrepresentation would be subject to a defense
of contributory fault if the court determined that the borrower was also
negligent in causing the harm.118 However, due to the complexity of
modern student loan payment options,119 it seems difficult to fault the
borrower for relying on his servicer. Finally, the statute of limitations for
negligent misrepresentation in Florida is subject to the delayed discovery
doctrine, meaning that the limitation period does not begin to run until
“the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should
have been discovered.”120
The success of a negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation claim
would likely depend on the specific fact pattern of the student loan
servicers’ PSLF practices. For instance, the situation in which a servicer
affirmatively told the borrower that her payments qualified for the loan
forgiveness program121 would make a strong fraudulent
misrepresentation claim. First, there is clearly a false statement—whether
the borrower’s repayments qualified for PSLF—of material fact. Second,
it seems likely that the borrower would be able to prove that his servicer
knew the status of his loan payment, and almost a certainty that the
servicer should have known the status of the borrower’s loan payment.
And while courts do not tend to focus on the third element, student loan
servicers clearly have an incentive to keep borrowers off of PSLF,
because doing so greatly increases their own income.122 Finally, any
116. Id. (quoting Elders, 793 So. 2d at 1042).
117. Id. (“One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation . . . for the purpose of inducing
another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability . . . .” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977))).
118. Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So. 2d 334, 338 (adopting the
Restatement (Second) of Torts’ position).
119. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 32, at 20 (“We service loans made under an
increasingly complex student loan program. Since 1990, the number of repayment options
available to borrowers has increased from two to 15—including multiple income-driven
repayment plans with similar sounding names and differing eligibility criteria. There are now
eight forgiveness programs and over 35 different deferment and forbearance options.”).
120. Mayor’s Jewelers, Inc. v. Meyrowitz, No. 12–80055–CIV, 2012 WL 2344609, at *4–5
(S.D. Fla. June 20, 2012) (applying Florida law). In Florida, the delayed discovery rule applies to
actions “founded upon fraud,” and for this purpose, negligent misrepresentation “sounds in fraud
rather than negligence.” Id.
121. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 30; see supra text accompanying notes
9–11.
122. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 32, at 44–45.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3 [], Art. 5

904

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

reasonable borrower, upon hearing that she was “all set,” would likely
rely on that information in deciding that no further action is necessary.123
While negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation may not be as likely to
succeed in a fact pattern where the servicer neglected to inform a
borrower about his payments’ ineligibility for PSLF, it is a strong option
for borrowers who were told that their payments were PSLF eligible. In
any case, the statute of limitations should not be an issue because even if
the borrower spent years making payments that were not PSLF
eligible,124 the limitation period would only begin once the borrower
realized that his servicer had deceived him.125
B. Unjust Enrichment
Another possible theory of recovery against student loan servicers is
that the servicers are being unjustly enriched by payments that do not
count toward PSLF. Unjust enrichment is “an equitable claim based on a
legal fiction which implies a contract as a matter of law” even though no
actual contract exists between the parties.126 Indeed, a claim for unjust
enrichment is precluded where an express contract already exists on the
same subject matter, for the proper claim would be one for breach of
contract.127 The FFEL loan Master Promissory Note permissively
allowed the borrower to consolidate his loan into a Direct Loan “to take
advantage of the public service loan forgiveness program,” but it did not
guarantee that the servicer would ensure that qualifying borrowers did
so.128 Thus, while a borrower may want to bring a breach of contract
claim in the alternative, the better cause of action likely lies with unjust
enrichment. The elements for an unjust enrichment claim are: “(1)
plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) defendant voluntarily
accepted and retained the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for

123. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 30.
124. A fact pattern described in the 2017 CFPB report. Id. at 29–30.
125. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
126. 14th & Heinberg, LLC v. Terhaar & Cronley Gen. Contractors, Inc., 43 So. 3d 877, 880
(Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
127. GTP Structures I, LLC v. Wisper II, LLC, 153 F. Supp. 3d 983, 992 (W.D. Tenn. 2015)
(quoting Diamond “S” Dev. Corp. v. Mercantile Bank, 989 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008))
(applying Florida law).
128. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OMB NO. 1845-0069, FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN
PROGRAM (FFELP): FEDERAL PLUS LOAN APPLICATION AND MASTER PROMISSORY NOTE,
https://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/attachments/FP0904PLUSHEOAExp083110.doc
[https://perma.cc/PPQ3-ZMW6].
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defendant to retain the benefit without paying the value of the benefit to
plaintiff.”129 Each element will be discussed in turn.
In order to satisfy the first element, student loan borrowers have to
show that they conferred a benefit upon student loan servicers. While
borrowers should have to make only 120 monthly payments before their
loans are forgiven under the PSLF program, if borrowers were misled by
their servicer, any payments that did not qualify for PSLF do not count
toward the required 120 monthly payments. When a student loan
borrower—who is otherwise eligible for PSLF—is misled into believing
that his payments qualified for PSLF, he confers a benefit upon his
servicer when he makes any payment after the 120th monthly payment.
Florida courts also emphasize that the plaintiff must directly confer the
benefit to the defendant.130 The benefit is not direct, for example, where
the plaintiff confers a benefit to the defendant’s subsidiary company or
to a corporation in which the defendant has two-thirds ownership, even
though the defendant receives a portion of that benefit.131 In this situation,
student loan servicers should be a direct beneficiary of loan repayments,
even though some servicers act on behalf of another lender.132
As for the second element, it should be easy to show that servicers
knowingly accepted the benefit by simply providing the billing
information for any payments after the 120th monthly payment. For the
third and final element, borrowers have to show that servicers’ practices
of receiving more than 120 monthly payments from PSLF-eligible
borrowers is unjust unless those borrowers are compensated. The unjust
enrichment claim will fail on this element if the defendant has “given
adequate consideration to someone for the benefit conferred.”133
However, it seems apparent that in the posed situation, borrowers receive
no compensation at all for the excess loan payments they have to pay due
to servicers’ misleading practices. After all, if not for the misleading
practices, borrowers would have completely wiped out their student loan
debt after the 120th payment; any additional money that borrowers have

129. Johnson v. Catamaran Health Sols., LLC, 687 F. App’x 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing
Fito v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 83 So. 3d 755, 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)) (applying Florida
law).
130. Kopel v. Kopel, 229 So. 3d 812, 118 (Fla. 2017).
131. Catamaran Health Sols., 687 F. App’x at 830 (applying Florida law); Kopel v. Kopel,
117 So. 3d 1147, 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 229 So. 3d 812.
132. While the holder of a loan and the servicer of a loan can be two different entities, the
two largest holders of FFEL loans, Navient and Nelnet, are also both loan servicers. Top 100
Current Holders of FFELP Loans for 2017 and 2016, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://fp.ed.gov/attachments/publications/FY2017Top100Lenders.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJC84G8H].
133. Am. Safety Ins. Serv. v. Griggs, 959 So. 2d 322, 331–32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3 [], Art. 5

906

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

to spend toward that debt is purely money lost to borrowers and money
gained by servicers.
With all three elements satisfied, borrowers should be able to receive
damages for the benefit unjustly conferred upon student loan servicers.
These damages are “measured in terms of the benefit to the owner, not
the cost to the provider.”134 The benefit to the student loan servicer will
depend on whether the servicer is also the lender of the loan. In either
situation, the servicer always receives a flat rate from the government.135
But where the servicer also holds the loan as a lender, the lender receives
the additional benefit of the entire principal repayment of the loan plus
interest subsidies from the government.136 Thus, under unjust enrichment,
borrowers could potentially receive more in damages than the amount of
money they lost in excess payments, but only if their loan servicer is also
the holder of the loan. If the loan servicer is a different entity from the
holder of the loan, courts may be concerned about the potential for the
plaintiff receiving a windfall through double recovery,137 and thus the
proper course of action may be to bring in the lender as a defendant.
Unjust enrichment has a statute of limitations of four years,138 and
because the unjust enrichment in this scenario occurs with each payment
after the 120th monthly payment, most borrowers should have no
difficulty being within the limitation period. One potential issue with this
theory of recovery is that it only recognizes harm as payments after the
120th monthly payment—each earlier payment would not be unjust
enrichment because the borrower intended to make 120 monthly
payments under the PSLF program. Thus, borrowers who are aware that
they have been deceived by their servicers and have since consolidated
their loan into a Direct loan may have to wait until they have made 120
monthly payments after consolidation before bringing this cause of
action.

134. Kane v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A., 85 So. 3d 1112, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012) (quoting Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL, 198 F.3d 802, 806 (11th Cir. 1999)).
135. While the flat rate is quite low for individual borrowers—2.85 dollars per month per
borrower—this could still contribute a substantial amount to damages in a class action suit with
many borrowers who each enriched their servicer for many years. Issue Primers Federal Student
Loan Financing, PNPI (July 9, 2018), http://pnpi.org/federal-student-loan-servicing/
[https://perma.cc/WVA9-MJYS].
136. 2010 U.S. DEP’T EDUC. ECASLA ANN. REP. 9, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/
default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/June2010ECASLAReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVA9MJYS] (describing how the government “no longer pays lenders default and interest rate subsidies
for these loans” after it purchases the loans from the lender).
137. Engelke v. Athel-Tech Comp. Sys., Inc., 982 So. 2d 3, 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
138. Beltran v. Vincent P. Miraglia, M.D., P.A., 125 So. 3d 855, 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
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C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claims against student loan servicers for breach of fiduciary duty have
not been widely successful.139 The elements of a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty are “the existence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach of
that duty such that it is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages.”140
The issue for student loan borrowers bringing breach of fiduciary duty
claims against their servicers is that generally, a fiduciary relationship
does not exist between a lender and a borrower.141 Despite the general
rule, a fiduciary relationship can be “based upon trust or confidence by
one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.”142 Under Florida law,
“the principle of fiduciary duty ‘extends to every possible case in which
a fiduciary relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed
on one side and the resulting superiority and influence on the other.’”143
This flexibility of definition is expanded by the court’s acknowledgement
of implied fiduciary duty.144
An implied fiduciary duty “is based on the circumstances surrounding
the transaction and the relationship of the parties,”145 and may be found
when “confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by the
other.”146 Thus, if a student loan servicer exhibited confidence in its
ability to help a borrower and the borrower indicated his trust in the
servicer, the servicer may actually have an implied fiduciary duty to the
borrower. Unfortunately, the conversations between borrower and
servicer that could have created such a duty would have happened years
ago in many cases, and it is unlikely that most borrowers would have
created and kept a recording. Nevertheless, a borrower is much more
likely to succeed on a theory of breach of implied fiduciary duty by
139. E.g., Ikeri v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. CV 13-1943 (DSD/JSM), 2014 WL 12599634, at *16
(D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2014); Genna v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7371 (LBS), 2012 WL 1339482,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2012).
140. Patten v. Winderman, 965 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Gracey v.
Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002)).
141. Genna, 2012 WL 1339482, at *4 (citing Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Block 3102 Corp.,
580 N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div. 1992)); Bank Leumi, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (“The legal relationship
between a borrower and a bank is a contractual one of debtor and creditor and does not create a
fiduciary relationship between the bank and its borrower or its guarantors.”).
142. Genna, 2012 WL 1339482, at *4 (quoting Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904
(App. Div. 1976)).
143. Fla. Bar v. Adorno, 60 So. 3d 1016, 1027–28 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Quinn v. Phipps, 113
So. 419, 421 (Fla. 1927)).
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Maxwell v. First United Bank, 782 So. 2d 931, 933–34 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001)).
146. Maxwell, 782 So. 2d at 933–34 (quoting Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc., 644 So. 2d 515,
518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)).
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alleging an exchange of confidence and trust, rather than making a
general allegation of breach of fiduciary duty.
The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is four years,
starting when the last element of the cause of action occurs.147 While
some borrowers may be able to bring an action against their servicer
within four years, this is only a small portion of the ten years that a
borrower may have continued making payments under the impression
that their payments counted toward PSLF. There may, however, be an
argument that could extend the statute of limitations. Courts differ as to
whether the last element of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty is the breach itself or damage caused by that breach.148 Because the
statute of limitations is based on when the last element occurs and
because there is a large gap between when the breach occurs and when
damages occur, this ambiguity is significant. If the last element of the
claim, and thus the start of the limitation period, is in fact the damages
caused by the breach, borrowers could argue that the damages do not
occur until the borrower has completed the 120 monthly payments—the
point at which the loan should have been forgiven. Nevertheless, breach
of fiduciary duty remains a difficult cause of action to bring.
III. UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES
The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or
practices, which offers a potential recourse for victimized borrowers.149
While the Act does not create a private right of action that borrowers
could bring, the CFPB regularly brings actions on consumers’ behalf.150
Notably, in January 2017 the CFPB filed action against Navient, one of
the main federal student loan servicers, for violating Title X of the DoddFrank Act, also known as the Consumer Financial Protection (CFP)
Act.151 The Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Navient’s motion to
dismiss, finding, among other things, that the CFPB had the authority to
bring the action and that it sufficiently pleaded Navient’s violations of
147. Davis v. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 2002); Woodward v. Woodward, 192 So.
3d 528, 531 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); see also Patten v. Winderman, 965 So. 2d 1222, 1224–25 (Fla.
4th DCA 2007) (explaining that breach of fiduciary duty is not subject to the delayed discovery
doctrine).
148. Compare Minotty v. Baudo, 42 So. 3d 824, 835–36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing Gracey
v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002)) (listing damages as a third element of the claim), with
Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 353 (listing breach as the second and final element of the claim, though
including within this element that the breach must result in damages).
149. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012).
150. Simpson v. Xerox Educ. Serv., LLC, No. 3:17-CV-00076-JHM, 2017 WL 6507654, at
*2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2017).
151. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530, at
*1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
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the Dodd-Frank Act.152 The CFPB’s preliminary success in Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau v. Navient Corp.153 is therefore an
indication that harm to student loan debtors who are working in public
service but not enrolled in the PSLF program may have a remedy through
the CFPB alleging unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices. While
the Navient court did not directly contemplate servicers’ PSLF practices,
its analysis provides a useful framework for discussing unfair, deceptive,
and abusive acts or practices in the PSLF context.
A. Abusive Acts or Practices
The CFPB’s first count against Navient was for abusive acts, and the
facts of this count most closely parallel servicers’ PSLF practices.154 The
complaint alleged that Navient advertised its ability to help borrowers
choose the best repayment plan for their individual needs, but “instead
steered borrowers into forbearance without adequately advising them
about other repayment options.”155 It is true that forbearance can be a
useful option for borrowers; forbearance offers a temporary reprieve from
payments156 and can thus be well-suited for situations such as that of a
borrower who is temporarily in between jobs. However, interest
continues to accrue during the forbearance period, and if it goes on for
long enough the interest will capitalize, increasing the principal.157 This
means that when a borrower in forbearance resumes payments, the
monthly payment will likely be larger, and there could be “a significant
increase in the total amount he or she must ultimately pay back.”158
Because of the drawbacks to forbearance, a borrower in long-term
financial hardship would be better served with an income-driven
repayment plan.159
Income-driven repayment plans take into account several factors to
calculate an affordable monthly payment—even one as low as $0 per
month.160 However, developing an income-based repayment plan for a
borrower is a much longer and more complicated process than simply
putting the borrower into forbearance, and Navient incentivizes its
employees to make phone calls with borrowers as short as possible.161
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at *9, *25.
No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
Id. at *19.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This practice resulted in an outcome one might expect: Navient “routinely
entered financially distressed borrowers into forbearance without
adequately discussing—or sometimes discussing at all—the option of
income-driven repayment plans.”162 Despite the numerous advantages of
income-driven repayment plans over forbearance, the number of
Navient’s borrowers in forbearance exceeded those in income-driven
repayment plans.163 The disregard for Navient’s borrowers’ financial
well-being stands in stark contrast to the representations on Navient’s
website—that it could help borrowers make the right decision for their
situation.164 According to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the
CFPB’s Complaint alleged sufficient facts for a count of abusive acts or
practices to survive Navient’s Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).165
There are two ways for an act or practice to be determined abusive
under the Dodd-Frank Act. First, the act or practice is abusive if it
“materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term
or condition of a consumer financial product or service.”166 Second, the
act or practice is abusive if it takes unreasonable advantage of:
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of
the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or
service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of
the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial
product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered
person to act in the interests of the consumer.167
The CFPB relied on 2(C), unreasonable advantage of reasonable
reliance, in its case against Navient.168 The court noted the CFPB’s
allegations that Navient took unreasonable advantage of that reliance by
failing to “give complete information on income-driven repayment plans
and instead push[ing] borrowers into forbearance,” which was “both
detrimental to borrowers and beneficial to Navient.”169 The court was
satisfied with the CFPB’s allegations that borrowers reasonably relied on
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *1, *19.
Id. at *19–20.
12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(1) (2012).
Id. § 5531(d)(2).
Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *19.
Id.
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Navient to act in their interests based on the representations on Navient’s
website and its invitation for borrowers to contact them for help,170
regardless of whether Navient had any legal duty to provide
individualized financial counseling to borrowers.171 As the court
observed, the Dodd-Frank Act does not state that duty is an element of
abusive act or practice.172 After all, reasonable reliance does not
necessarily come from a preexisting legal duty.173 Therefore, as long as a
borrower’s reliance on a loan servicer is reasonable, any act that takes
unreasonable advantage of that reliance could qualify as an abusive act.174
According to the court, the CFPB’s allegations were sufficient at the
pleading stage to allege an abusive act or practice.175
The similarities between Navient’s forbearance practices and
servicers’ PSLF practices described in the CFPB report are persuasive
that the law should apply to them similarly. The CFPB reported that after
borrowers communicated to their servicer that they worked in public
service, servicers “withh[e]ld essential information about eligibility for
PSLF.”176 Further, some borrowers informed their servicer of their
intention to pursue PSLF, only for their servicer to place them into a
nonqualifying repayment plan.177 The consequences of servicers’ actions
were the years that borrowers paid into a nonqualifying repayment plan
and the increased costs of doing so.178 Therefore, in both the PSLF
context and in the CFPB’s suit against Navient, servicers failed to
proactively inform borrowers about an option that would have
significantly improved their financial situations.
The CFPB’s action against Navient and the Middle District of
Pennsylvania’s denial of Navient’s Motion to Dismiss lays the
groundwork for potential abusive practices claims against servicers for
PSLF practices. If a servicer made positive representations about its
ability to help borrowers choose an appropriate repayment plan, the
CFPB should be able to show that the borrowers reasonably relied on
their servicer to act in their interests. From there, borrowers must also be
able to show that their servicer took unreasonable advantage of their
reliance. If failing to inform borrowers about a more suitable incomedriven repayment plan constitutes taking unreasonable advantage of
170. Id. at *19–20.
171. Id.
172. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
173. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *19–20 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 90 (AM. LAW INST. 2017)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, 29–30.
177. Id. at 33.
178. Id. at 29–33.
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borrowers, then failing to inform them about their eligibility for the PSLF
program should as well. The CFPB took note that not putting a borrower
on a suitable income-driven repayment plan was detrimental to the
borrower and beneficial to Navient,179 and the same is true for not
informing a borrower about the PSLF program. After all, a servicer loses
money whenever a borrower is placed into PSLF because “doing so
currently leads to the loan being reassigned to a specialty server.”180 And
it seems clear that the borrower’s loss of access to loan forgiveness causes
significant financial harm. Therefore, the CFPB should have a strong
case, on behalf of borrowers who were not informed about their eligibility
for PSLF, against servicers under 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) for abusive acts or
practices.
B. Unfair Acts or Practices
The CFPB’s second and third counts against Navient were for unfair
acts or practices, using both the same facts as the first count as well as
additional information about Navient’s failure to adequately notify
borrowers about necessary paperwork.181 Under the income-driven
repayment plans, borrowers must submit renewal paperwork annually.182
Although failure to submit this paperwork results in potentially
irreversible consequences for borrowers, Navient’s notice to borrowers
about the deadline, both through email and nonelectronic mail, did not
fully inform borrowers as to what was required of them.183 The emails
had a subject line of either “Your Sallie Mae Account Information” or
“New Document Ready to View,” and the body of the email simply stated
that “a new education loan document is available. Please log in to your
account to view it,” and contained a hyperlink to Navient’s website. The
nonelectronic mail informed borrowers that their income-driven
repayment plan would “expire in approximately 90 days” and that the
“renewal process may take at least 30 days.”184 The Middle District of
Pennsylvania determined that under both Navient’s forbearance practices
(from Count I) and its notice practices, the CFPB adequately pleaded a
claim for unfair acts or practices.185

179. Id.
180. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 32, at 46.
181. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530, at
*20, *21 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
182. Id. at *2.
183. Id. at *2–3.
184. Id. at *3.
185. Id. at *20–23.
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There is a two-part test to determine whether an act or practice is
unfair under the Dodd-Frank Act.186 First, “the act or practice causes or
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers.”187 Second, “such substantial injury is not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.”188 An injury is reasonably avoidable if “consumers had a
free and informed choice.”189 With both Navient’s forbearance practices
and its notice practices, the court found that the CFPB’s allegations, if
true, meant that borrowers would be unlikely to know that they needed to
seek information beyond what their servicer told them either by phone,
mail, or email.190 Thus, while consumers may have had a free choice, the
choice was not informed, and thus the injury was likely not reasonably
avoidable.
Based on this standard and with the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s
analysis as guidance, the CFPB would also likely succeed on a claim that
servicers’ PSLF practices are unfair. First, the CFPB should have little
difficulty in proving that the practice of not informing borrowers about
their PSLF eligibility is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.
Just like Navient’s forbearance and notice practices, servicers’ PSLF
practices can have permanent consequences on borrowers by increasing
the total amount they must pay toward their loan. Also, the reasonable
avoidability of this harm is analogous to that of both Navient’s
forbearance and notice practices: because borrowers do not have a free
and informed choice where a servicer fails to inform them of their
eligibility for PSLF based on their repayment plan, the harm of losing out
on PSLF payments was not reasonably avoidable. Second, it seems clear
that there are no countervailing benefits to consumers or competition by
not informing borrowers about their PSLF eligibility. PSLF encourages
college graduates to serve the public good in lower paying jobs.
Preventing graduates from accessing the compensation for this service
that Congress provided has no public benefit. Therefore, the CFPB should
have a good chance at succeeding on an unfair acts or practices claim
against servicers on the behalf of public service workers who were not
informed about their PSLF eligibility.

186. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (2012).
187. Id. § 5531(c)(1)(A).
188. Id. § 5531(c)(1)(B).
189. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *21 (quoting FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1158
(9th Cir. 2010)).
190. Id. at *21, *22.
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C. Deceptive Acts or Practices
Finally, the CFPB’s complaint also alleged several counts of
deceptive acts or practices.191 One count was for the mailed notices about
the renewal paperwork for income-driven repayment plans, which stated
that incorrect or incomplete information would result in a delay, “and thus
implied that delay was the only consequence of submitting incorrect or
incomplete information, when in truth it could have several irreversible
consequences.”192 The remaining counts alleged that Navient informed
defaulting borrowers that the federal loan rehabilitation program would
reduce the consequences of default more than the program actually did.193
While the Dodd-Frank Act clearly defines the criteria for abusive and
unfair acts, it does not define any criteria for a deceptive act. 194 Instead,
courts evaluating deceptive practices under the Dodd-Frank Act apply the
test used for deceptive acts under the Federal Trade Commission Act.195
According to this test, an act or practice is deceptive if: “(1) ‘there is a
representation, omission, or practice that,’ (2) ‘is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances,’ and (3) ‘the
representation, omission, or practice is material.’”196 Courts consider
deception based on the “net impression” a representation has on the
consumer.197 Applying this test, the Middle District of Pennsylvania was
able to determine that Navient’s practice of “creat[ing] a false impression
that a processing delay was the only adverse consequence of filing an
incomplete or inaccurate application[]” was a sufficient pleading for a
deceptive act.198 And although circuits are split on the issue of whether
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement
for allegations of fraud or mistake applies to allegations of a deceptive
act,199 the Eleventh Circuit has not weighed in on the issue.200
191. Id. at *23–26.
192. Id. at *23.
193. Id. at *24.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012); Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *23.
195. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *23 (citing Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819
F.3d 1179, 1193 n.7 (9th Cir. 2016)).
196. Id. (quoting Gordon, 819 F.3d at 1192–93).
197. Id. (quoting Gordon, 819 F.3d at 1193).
198. Id. at *23–24.
199. The 9th Circuit has expanded Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard to claims in
which fraud is not an element, reasoning that using the word deceptive instead of fraud did “not
detract from the apparently fraudulent nature of the allegations.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v.
Prime Mktg. Holdings, LLC, No. CV1607111-BRO (JEMX), 2016 WL 10516097, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 15, 2016) (quoting FTC v. Lights of Am., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (C.D. Cal.
2010)). On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit and some district courts more strictly limit 9(b) to
fraud. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *24–25; Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna
& Assoc., P.C., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1371–74 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
200. Frederick J. Hanna & Assoc., 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1371–72.
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According to the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s analysis, the
CFPB should also be able to make a successful claim that student loan
servicers engaged in deceptive acts or practices. As the CFPB report
indicated, loan servicers led borrowers to believe that their payments
were eligible for PSLF, when they in fact were not.201 The net impression
of the servicers’ representation was that borrowers working in public
service jobs only needed to continue making their loan payments for 120
months in order for their loans to be forgiven. It logically follows that a
borrower acting reasonably under the circumstances would continue
making loan payments. However, that borrower would be misled,
because the borrower would in fact have to consolidate his loan into a
Direct loan in order for his payments to be PSLF eligible.202 Also, the
misleading would be material, because it has great impact on the
decisions the borrower makes.203
Therefore, servicers’ PSLF practices should meet all three factors of
the test for deceptive acts or practices.204
D. Statute of Limitations
The CFPB’s final hurdle in bringing action against student loan
servicers for the violation of the Dodd-Frank Act is that the claims must
be within the statute of limitations. The law on this matter is explicit:
“Except as otherwise permitted by law or equity, no action may be
brought under this title more than 3 years after the date of discovery of
the violation to which an action relates.”205 The 3-year limitation period
does not start at the “mere receipt of a consumer complaint.”206 Rather,
such a consumer complaint would only put the CFPB on inquiry notice
that it should investigate the matter for a possible violation.207 The
limitation period begins when the CFPB discovers “the facts constituting
the violation.”208 It is unclear from the CFPB’s reports exactly when it
discovered the facts constituting student loan servicers’ unfair, deceptive,
and abusive acts or practices; however, it seems likely that the CFPB was
201. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7.
202. Id. at 29.
203. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. NDG Fin. Corp., No. 15-cv-5211 (CM), 2016 WL
7188792, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (describing a material misrepresentation as one “likely
to affect consumer decisionmaking”); Material Misrepresentation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (“A false statement to which a reasonable person would attach importance in
deciding how to act . . . .”).
204. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *23.
205. 12 U.S.C. § 5564(g)(1) (2012).
206. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., No. 15-CV-02106RS, 2017 WL 3948396, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017).
207. Id.
208. Id.
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aware of the facts by time it published them in its June 2017 report.209
While the CFPB has been less aggressive under its recent leadership,210
time remains to see whether the CFPB will act on the PSLF issues raised
in its reports. Furthermore, the CFPB may have an argument that its
statute of limitations has only began to run more recently based on the
discovery of new facts.
CONCLUSION
The Public Service Loan Forgiveness program offered much-needed
relief to a class of borrowers who put public service ahead of their own
financial needs. While a complete forgiveness of loans, regardless of their
value, is generous, borrowers who decided to pursue PSLF made a huge
commitment: ten years of public service. For a borrower who has worked
for years with the understanding that his loans would be forgiven after
the 120th monthly payment, the realization that his payments were not in
fact PSLF eligible would be devastating. And yet, because of the
practices of student loan servicers, this exact scenario is unfolding across
the country. With only one percent of applications for loan forgiveness
being approved, the problem is obvious, and initial litigation is already
laying the ground for a continued increase in litigation against student
loan servicers.
For borrowers wanting to bring action against their student loan
servicer, the first step will be overcoming an argument of federal
preemption. Despite a Ninth Circuit holding to the contrary, precedent
best supports the conclusion that the Higher Education Act does not
preempt state law claims against student loan servicers. While no court
has considered whether there is a valid cause of action against student
loan servicers for their PSLF practices, there are at least three causes of
action that could succeed under Florida law. Harm through
misinformation seems to best fall under fraudulent misrepresentation,
and, indeed, that might be the strongest cause of action available to
borrowers. There is also a compelling argument that servicers are unjustly
enriched by their actions, although courts may be skeptical of the idea
that a doctrine originating in property law should apply to loan payments
spanning several years. Finally, even though courts have consistently
found that loan servicers do not owe borrowers a fiduciary duty, courts
may be amenable to recovery under breach of implied fiduciary duty.
209. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 27–43.
210. Pressure Mounts on CFPB Over Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, PYMNTS
(Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.pymnts.com/consumer-finance/2019/cfpb-public-service-loanforgiveness/ [https://perma.cc/8UJ8-BQRP]; Chris Arnold, Trump Administration Plans to
Defang Consumer Protection Watchdog, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/12/
584980698/trump-administration-to-defang-consumer-protection-watchdog [https://perma.cc/
U3NB-CX3Q].
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Alternatively, while the Consumer Financial Protection Act does not
give borrowers a private right of action, it does give the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau a potent cause of action against student loan
servicers. Not only do the elements for unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts
or practices align very closely to servicers’ PSLF practices, but the CFPB
has already had preliminary success against a student loan servicer on a
very similar fact pattern. States are already starting to bring actions
against student loan servicers based on state-law claims that closely
resemble the Dodd-Frank Act,211 thus broadening the avenues for justice.
Unless Congress takes action to protect student loan borrowers,212 only
litigation can allow borrowers turn back the clock on their student loan
payments and receive the forgiveness that they deserve.

211. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp. 529, 561–64 (M.D. Pa. 2018)
(applying Pennsylvania law to claims that a student loan servicer engaged in unfair, deceptive,
and abusive practices); Attorney General James And Superintendent Vullo Announce $9 Million
Settlement Of Federal Student Loan Servicing Claims With Acs Education Services, NEW YORK
STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: PRESS RELEASES (Jan. 4, 2019) (announcing a
settlement with a student loan servicer for “claims that a federal student loan servicer deceived
borrowers concerning the availability of Public Service Loan Forgiveness”), https://ag.ny.gov/
press-release/attorney-general-james-and-superintendent-vullo-announce-9-million-settlementfederal [https://perma.cc/M59V-ANNU].
212. Congress has taken a welcome first step of approving a one-time 350 million-dollar
fund that will allow borrowers who would be eligible for PSLF but for having the wrong loan
type to have their loans canceled on a first-come, first-serve basis. Michael Stratford, Compromise
‘Fix’ for Public Service Loan Forgiveness, POLITICO (Mar. 23, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-education/2018/03/23/compromise-fix-for-public
-service-loan-forgiveness-149361 [https://perma.cc/JQ6G-5356]. And a recently introduced bill
would expand qualifying payments for PSLF to include FFEL loans. Annie Nova, Bill May Help
Millions Qualify for Popular Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, CNBC (Apr. 11, 2019,
5:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/11/bill-may-help-millions-qualify-for-popular-publicservice-loan-forgiveness-program.html [https://perma.cc/S7ZX-29ED].
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